why we encouraged the Administrative Law Judge this morning and encourage you. The 271 investigation was just initiated last week. We encouraged you to get a procedural schedule started. We are not trying to delay, but none of us can start the review of whether or not Bell is in compliance until we get the information from Bell. So to the extent that their filing with the FCC is slowed down, I think they have to look to themselves and realize that they have not yet provided the information to us.

For that reason, we would request that you reverse the decision in 97-20. There is no - - All you are doing by allowing the interim effect is to shorten the period of time you have to review before you consult with the Commission, and also to uphold the ALJ in its ruling in 97-64.

CHAIRMAN GRAVES: Thank you.

MR. RUTAN: Your Honor, could I just add a reference? I had mentioned there was an earlier reference in the transcript?

CHAIRMAN GRAVES: Yes, sir.

MR. RUTAN: It is page 30 of the transcript, Your Honor, where Mr. Pelto said, "You will also hear today that there are substantial deficiencies with the statement, vis-a-vis, Section 251. It does not comply with Section 252, it does not comply with the FCC's order, it does not

will it ever be concluded quicker. I suspect it is not in

lw-119 the best interest of parties from either perspective when there is time lines to give up any days that have been granted to either side in the time lines that are there. MS. THOMPSON: Well, but what I'm suggesting 5 is the procedural schedule itself - -CHAIRMAN GRAVES: Well, I understand. 7 MS. THOMPSON: - - can have a hearing date R that's less than 90 days from now. CHAIRMAN GRAVES: Well, I understand that. 10 But I suspect that there are going to be others that will come in and say this is too critical, these are important, 12 these matters are of such importance we have got to be 13 absolutely certain that we, again, meet our needs. And I understand it. And that's fine. I'm just saying that it is 15 unlikely that anybody is going to voluntarily give up any 16 abilities that they have under the various provisional 17 provisions of the Act. 18 MS. THOMPSON: We are still in the process of 19 discussing it among the parties, as we were ordered to by 20 the Administrative Law Judge. But a proposed procedural 21 schedule has already been distributed that would have a 22 hearing on Day 73. And then that gives you from that time. 23

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CHAIRMAN GRAVES: I understand. I understand.

Then it is up to you to get it out.

MS. THOMPSON: And so it could possibly go by And, like I say, this is just a proposal. But that's assuming as soon as Bell files then we get the ball rolling. CHAIRMAN GRAVES: I will believe it when I 6 see it. Mr. Cadieux, you may proceed. 8 MR. CADIEUX: May it please the Commission, 9 very briefly. 10 COMMISSIONER APPLE: Excuse me. I just want 11 to comment, that would be pleasing. 12 MR. CADIEUX: I'm going to try to hold it 13 The first point, Southwestern Bell already has an down. 14 expedited procedure. The 60 day, what I'll call, 15 provisional effectiveness pending a hearing on the merits of 16 the SGTC, that's in effect an interim or provisional 17 expedited procedure in itself. So what you are being asked 18 to do in the interim relief is basically expedite an expedited procedure. And, as Commissioner Graves indicated, 20 the parties are going to be reluctant to give up time that 21 they're entitled to. 22 In effect the interim relief request is 23 24

asking you to give up time that you are entitled to, 30 days of precious time. If you go from this day forward and you just take the face value that Southwestern Bell has said

publicly that if you approve the interim relief requested, they will be at the FCC almost immediately. The difference of approving or allowing the interim relief requested to go into effect or not is 50 days versus 20 days. And I would tie that into I think the Commission should - - needs to consider what the scope of its consultantive role is, because I'm afraid it may be implicit from how Southwestern Bell may have characterized its view of the consultantive role or what it would file in 97-64. It may oversimplify.

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In our view, and I think that's going to be the view of the other parties, it is not just a matter of the Commission receiving interconnection agreements that it has already approved or the SGTC. If the Commission's consultantive role covers the whole laundry list of is Track B satisfied, is Track A satisfied, is the competitive check list satisfied, and I would also - - I think it is in 271(D)(3) the Commission should keep in mind that there is a separate public interest standard for the Commission to consider in determining whether to allow - - to - - well, whether the FCC should allow interLATA entry. And logically and obviously the Commission should also - - the scope of your consultation with the FCC should be that same coverage. So I think you need to take the public interest question or scope into this. Which leads into my conclusion that the Commission's investigation here positions themselves to do a

commission's investigation here pos

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consultative review. And to some extent I think is going to
be fact intensive.

The questions have started to come up, and I don't particularly want to get into them today, and I don't think you do, about, well, what is the nature of Brook's network, what are they doing, where are they. Some parties are going to argue that that is definitely very relevant in terms of whether Track A, for example, is met. And that is going to be a factual investigation.

Now Brooks realizes particularly in a state like Oklahoma where it is the first company to have a signed interconnection agreement, an approved interconnection agreement, and it is the first company that's starting to pass live traffic, we are going to be a major subject of that factual inquiry, and we are fully prepared to be as helpful as we can to the Commission. But we have an interest in ensuring or hoping that the process that the Commission - - the procedure that the Commission has to do that investigation has at least a reasonable amount of time under the circumstance. So question. Should you make it 20 days or should you make it 50 days.

And, frankly, the last point I will make is,

I want you to picture the scenario of what is going to

happen if you grant interim relief. You will have a 271

filing within probably a day or two. It won't be restricted

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to Track B. It will cover the gamut. It will be Track A.

It will say we meet the standards of Track A, we meet the standards of Track B, we meet the check list. Your clock,

your 20 day clock, begins to run immediately.

At the same time there is going to be objections and motions in front of the FCC saying, wait a minute, Track B isn't even available to Southwestern Bell in That's certainly going to be Brook's position, Oklahoma. because if you read Section B of 271 it is pretty clear to me that Track B is only available and a SGTC can only have 271 implications if nobody - - no carrier has filed a request for interconnection. That clearly is not the case here. So you are going to have - - While your 20 day clock is already running, you're not going to know whether it is a live clock or not. 10 days through it the FCC may say, you know, we are going to throw this out because Track B is not available. But it is going to put you in the dilemma do I immediately rush and do whatever I can within 20 days to discharge my role, or do I do nothing, or do I start under a process or under an assumption I'm really going to have 50 days, a real mess.

So again - - One last point. This is a little - - a variation off of what Mr. Rutan was saying.

Irrespective of whether you agree with the position that as soon as the SGTC went out the door it was offered and,

1w-124 therefore, available, even if you don't accept that for 2 purposes of argument, the fact is that there is nothing in 3 the Federal Act that would have prevented Southwestern Bell from taking that exact same document in the binder that has been filed in the form of the SGTC and for any CLEC that 6 either is currently in the door negotiating with them or might come in the door tomorrow to say, look, we can negotiate a bilateral deal, you know, we have got some flexibility to see what your needs are, but, if you want, 10 you might want to take a look at - - this is kind of a standing offer that we would be willing to enter into in a 12 bilateral agreement. And if a CLEC wanted to do it, it 13 could say great, sign it, file it with the state commission, 14 a 90 days time requirement, and the standard of review is 15

The point is, to the extent there is an argument that the SGTC has an independent value apart from 271 triggering, that is a red herring, because the same thing could have been done without using the SGTC form. The reason the SGTC form was used was 271 triggering, pure and simple. That is all I have.

the limited standard under Section 252(E).

CHAIRMAN GRAVES: Thank you.

COMMISSIONER APPLE: Let me ask a little information relative to your statement that you are competitively in the market now. Where do you actually

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stand? Where are we?

MR. CADIEUX: Well, I'm trying to -
Actually I'm trying to get current information from Tulsa.

I did -- I am -- Brooks is already starting to get

requests for information from the Department of Justice,

from other interested parties, some of whom are in the room

today, for the very reasons we are talking about here. And

I'm beginning the process of trying to put relevant

information together.

But I'll tell you right now I can tell you for Oklahoma City, we actually completed interconnection and started to pass live traffic in mid-January with

Southwestern Bell. To date we have five switched service business customers, on-net customers, customers who are directly connected to our fiber. We have one test residential customer on a resell basis. And I can - There is a lot - This will be a lot of the factual background.

I mean, one of the things that's going on here, you know, Brooks has made no bones about it that its preferred mode of operation is using unbundled loops from Southwestern Bell. In order to do that, we have to go out and build physical collocations. And that process has taken a lot longer than we had anticipated. And we are not there yet. So, yes, we have started to pass live traffic by five on-net customers and have one test resale customer.

2	COMMISSIONER APPLE: Are dial tones being
3	used?
-	MR. CADIEUX: In Oklahoma, yes. I believe
4	the situation is pretty similar in Tulsa. And I will have
5	information on that shortly.
6	COMMISSIONER APPLE: It is a fact?
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8	MR. CADIEUX: It is a fact.
9	COMMISSIONER APPLE: In that regard, there i
10	competition in Oklahoma with a dial tone, is that correct?
11	MR. CADIEUX: There is for those customers.
12	Now what the implications are for this for Section 271 is a
13	whole separate issue.
14	COMMISSIONER APPLE: But it is a start.
15	MR. CADIEUX: It is a start and we're glad t
16	be a part of it.
; 17 ;	CHAIRMAN GRAVES: Thank you, Mr. Cadieux.
18 .	Mr. Stakem.
19	MR. STAKEM: Mr. Chairman, members of the
20	Commission, I thank you for waiting so patiently to hear my
21	remarks.
22	COMMISSIONER APPLE: May our patience be
	rewarded.
23	CHAIRMAN GRAVES: We hope they're worth it.
24	MR. STAKEM: And I'm happy to report that is
25	You know, it's a blessing and a curse to be the end.
	102 Allow, 10 B a Diessing and a cuise to be the end.
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You get very disorganized when you go last, I have
discovered, but you have less to say.

So, let me share with you a couple of views and then make a couple of comments about the motion that's sort of lost in all of this, the Motion to Dismiss.

COMMISSIONER APPLE: Oh, that.

MR. STAKEM: But I would like to address the interim relief first and then a few words about the Motion to Dismiss.

And the first comment I have to make has to do with the Commission - - the ALJ Goldfield's approach and the notion that while a statement of generally available terms and conditions may have an independent purpose under Section 252, when one is filed, and in particular when one is - - one asks as they did for interim relief, the Administrative Law Judge and this Commission can nonetheless treat it separately, distinctly, and manage it as if it has no impact on Section 271. I think it is just wrong as a matter of fact to have taken that approach on the motion for interim relief, and it is wrong as a matter of law.

Try as he might or try as you might to try to keep 252 filing and the SGTC effect limited to the local exchange market and how it might impact expected new entrants and other participants in the local exchange market as a 252 stand-alone document, try as you might to keep the

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focus on the local exchange market, that's not what you were asked to do on interim relief, and it is not possible as a matter of law.

I'm glad that Mr. Toppins brought with him as a demonstration his wonderful charts about interLATA long distance interexchange competition, because, among other things, and we agree with it, we have known for a long time that 85 percent of the market would like to have But what it focuses on that is important for competition. this is the interim relief request isn't about the local exchange market, what's available there and what will this document, wherever it is now, will this document help people get into the local exchange market. That is not at all what the request for interim relief is all about. And this is just perfect proof of it. It is about using it for the trigger that it is if you grant the interim relief for 271 to get into the interexchange market. Don't be confused about it. They were up front about it in their motion. We are entitled to take them at their word. The benefit they see in interim relief is that it might make it faster for them to get into the interexchange market than it otherwise And the other side of it to the extent that they would be. bow in the direction of the local exchange market, they say, well, nobody is going to be harmed in the local exchange market. Well, it is artificial to think that you can

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separate the two. As a matter of law you can't do it. And the reason you can't is in 271(C)(1)(b) the law equates permission to go into effect with approval for the purpose of triggering the right to file an application.

Commissioner Graves asked earlier, where is the reference in 271 that its permission to go into effect. And it is 271(C)(1)(b). And it says in part, quote, "A statement of the terms and conditions that the company generally offers to provide such access and interconnection has been approved or permitted to take effect by the state commission."

So the law equates the two, permission to take effect with approval, and it is the triggering. That's the only reason why this is a possibility, that it remains a possibility for Southwestern Bell to say there will be benefits to competition some day in the interLATA market, let's make it go faster. But this case is not about delay. This case is about haste.

CHAIRMAN GRAVES: But approval or permission to take effect does not in and of itself mean that competition exists and that other requirements of 271 have been met.

MR. STAKEM: Certainly it does not. CHAIRMAN GRAVES: Okay.

MR. STAKEM: So make no mistake about it. It

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is appropriate to consider a 271 because you were asked to by the company and because you can't avoid it in any event because of the way the law is drafted. Now - - And you then really have to stop and think looking at Section 252 and this notion, what does it mean to have the Federal government giving us another choice for decision making. We are use to thinking about approving orders or requests. We are use to thinking about denying them or disapproving them. Now we get a third choice in this statute sort of strangely. The choice is permit it to go into effect. It is a strange animal.

It has been exclaimed that a generally available term and condition, you know, it has to be really available as in offered to the public or it can't by definition satisfy as a generally available term. It is sort of like buying clothes off the rack. I mean, it either is hanging there and you can go and take it down and take it to the check out, or it is not. And for you to say that the store is open, the garment is on the rack means to say that they really are offered for sale. They can't have it the way they like, which was it is only offered, it's only available to you, we're only going to let you out of the store if the Commission also tells us that we can use this as a trigger to go to the FCC.

So, here is in part where my Motion to

Dismiss overlaps those arguments that I would make about the denial of interim relief. My point in part, if you looked at Section 252 and this notion that there is this third choice, perhaps permission, it is false to suggest that it is really a choice. The way we believe the statute should be interpreted, 252(F), is that this permission to go into effect happens by default. You are required to hold a substantive review and to either approve or to disapprove, and our view is that you have to do that approval or disapproval within 60 days or by default this third category of sequence happens, this permission to go into effect.

In the context of this, and it is not the best drafted statute in the world, and certainly that's true, in the context of a requirement though, think about it, the Federal government has said the Commission may not approve an SGTC if it does not comply with 251. Okay? There is an absolute prohibition. It says that you must conduct a substantive review. And it protects against delay by allowing the effect of triggering the ability to request interim relief at the end of 60 days. There is no reason looking at the Act as a whole to believe that the Federal government expected the Commission to at any time short of 60 days to enter an order permitting something to go into effect. Just the reverse is true for the reasons that we oppose the interim relief. The job is substantial. The job

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is important. The job needs to be done right. And you
shouldn't short change yourself in the time that you have to

do that.

So we have argued the proper interpretation of 252 is that you really don't have the power to do it.

That's not a proper reading of the statute. Even if you do, you shouldn't exercise your discretion to do that because you have handcuffed yourself and shortened the time.

Mr. Toppins talked about entitlement and what his company was entitled to. You know, if we really want to get down to talk about hypertechnicalities, if we really want to part the statute or we really want to play the game of let's make sure everybody is entitled to exactly what they are entitled to and they take advantage of it, it is that you are entitled to 60 days and you ought to take the 60 days. And they haven't, as the Attorney General suggested to you, presented any good reason why you should not.

And, by the way, if you look at the Michigan order that they attached, I think it is Michigan, it may be another jurisdiction, attached to support their interim relief motion where it was permitted to go into effect, it happened only on the 60th day. It happened by default. I'm not aware of any place in the country, and I stand to be corrected, but I'm not aware of any place in the country

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where the Commission is concerned that it doesn't know on the merits what it wants to do, nonetheless allows it, permits it to go into effect quicker than 60 days. Maybe there is such a place.

Let me turn to the Dismissal Motion and this notion that you should never approve or allow it to go into effect on an interim basis. If you have some real concern about the merits, it is not likely that you will ultimately succeed on those merits. That's precisely the situation There are some big points. It is not supported by costs studies required by Section 251. You know that from the arbitrations. Those cost studies haven't been finished, they're not going to be finished - - or I don't know when they're going to be finished and presented, but there is going to be an evidentiary hearing on them. What I do know is that the rates - - or believe to be the case, the rates in this document are not supported by those cost studies. The statute says it has to be supported by those cost studies and the statutes prohibits you from approving the document if it doesn't comply with those statutes. It is beyond me how anybody could suggest in this forum under those circumstances this document for that reason alone could ever be approved. And if that's the state of events, there is not much reason to do anything about it now.

There are other reasons. They're all

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2	detailed in our motion. There were four or five specific
3	reasons, shortcomings in the document, ways in which it
4	violates the statute. And I won't belabor those points, but
5	to the extent that there is serious question about the
6	merits, you should be all the more inclined to disapprove
7	interim request for relief.
8 !	CHAIRMAN GRAVES: Can we disapprove it after
9 '	the 60th day?
10	MR. STAKEM: Well, I think you have it
11	Well, can you disapprove the statement?
12	CHAIRMAN GRAVES: Statement.
13	MR. STAKEM: After the Certainly.
14	CHAIRMAN GRAVES: Okay. Well, then I
15	MR. STAKEM: You can't do the other.
16	CHAIRMAN GRAVES: You can't approve it after
17	60 days.
18	MR. STAKEM: Well, you can't approve it
19	unless Yes, you can approve it after the 60th day. You
20	can't approve it without a determination that it complies
21	with Section 251.
22	CHAIRMAN GRAVES: I understand that. Okay.
23	All right.
24	MR. STAKEM: I misunderstood your question.
	CHAIRMAN GRAVES: And I was concerned earlier
25	I thought I heard you say that after 60 days it is permitted
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2	to go into effect.
3	MR. STAKEM: Well, that is sort of
4	CHAIRMAN GRAVES: And it is sort of preempted
5	at that point from action.
6	MR. STAKEM: No. No. By default on the 60th
7	day it is given the trigger effect.
8	CHAIRMAN GRAVES: Okay.
9	MR. STAKEM: If the company on the 60th day -
10	-
11	CHAIRMAN GRAVES: Wants to file?
12	MR. STAKEM: Wants to file
13	CHAIRMAN GRAVES: They can?
14	MR. STAKEM: Yes.
15	CHAIRMAN GRAVES: Regardless of whether we
16	have taken action or not?
17	MR. STAKEM: Yes.
8	CHAIRMAN GRAVES: Okay. All right. I
9	understand your point then. Go ahead.
20	MR. STAKEM: And if you would give me just
: 21	one moment to look over my notes, I don't think I have
22	anything else to add to those remarks. Thank you for your
3	attention. If there are any questions.
! 4	VICE CHAIRMAN ANTHONY: State the full title
5	to your Motion to Dismiss.
	MR. STAKEM: All right. From memory?

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This is a whopper. "MCI Telecommunications
Corporation's Motion to Intervene, Objections and Motion to
Dismiss the Application of Southwestern Bell Telephone
Company for Approval of a Statement of Generally Available
Terms and Conditions Under the Telecommunications Act of
1996, and the Motion of Southwestern Bell Telephone Company
for Interim Order Permitting its Statement of Generally
Available Terms and Conditions to go into its Effect."

VICE CHAIRMAN ANTHONY: So it applied to the interim relief and the merits.

MR. STAKEM: Yes. It did.

VICE CHAIRMAN ANTHONY: Thank you.

MR. STAKEM: And there was a supplement that has a similar title.

COMMISSIONER APPLE: A sequel?

MR. STAKEM: The sequel. The sequel comes when we have an evidentiary hearing.

CHAIRMAN GRAVES: Thank you, Mr. Stakem.

Mr. Gray.

MR. GRAY: Your Honor, I will endeavor to make this as quick as possible.

First of all, Your Honor, you might ask how my arguments will be. Let me say first I will start off by addressing the comments made by the parties and then I will

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proceed to my arguments.

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inconsistent.

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First of all, Your Honors, start off with the comments made by Southwestern Bell. Mr. Toppins makes a statement that the ruling of the ALJ is inconsistent and that the ALJ said let it go into effect but then he said - - then when the ALJ said 90 day notice, that's inconsistent. However, Your Honors, I don't believe the ALJ was inconsistent. I think it is important that the Commission remembers that we are talking about two different sections. We have got a Section 252 and a 271. And where the ALJ's arguments were based on 252, he said that, okay, it can go into effect under 252. So I don't believe the ALJ was being inconsistent because he was not even addressing 271 at the time. Now when the time comes for us to address 271, that's

Mr. Toppins also makes the argument there is no requirement under the Federal law for the 90 days. I would agree that there is no law, that there is no requirement for it, but there is no prohibition on it either.

when he said 90 days notice. So I don't believe the ALJ was

He said that it violates Federal law.

However, he failed to provide any support as to how it

violates Federal law. I believe where the Congress felt it

was necessary to put restrictions in and so forth, they did

so. If you review the documentation or if you review the Act and everything, you will see where they determined that time frames or restrictions were necessary, they did that.

Mr. Toppins chose to characterize it as being illegal. Like I say, I don't believe that's supported. I don't think you will find anywhere where it says that it is illegal. I think the key factor here is the timing of it. Probably if we had been back in July or we had made this request in July, I don't think Southwestern Bell would have had any problems with it. I don't think they would have said it was illegal at that time. But I think due to their timing and where we are today, I think they have a problem with it. It might be legitimate, but I guess my argument is I don't believe it is illegal.

The ALJ made the mention - - The AG mentioned regarding the motion. And this may be a petty argument to the Commission, however, I will be back here next year having to address the issue. This was not a motion hearing. It started off on the motion docket. Then the Administrative Law Judge continued it to a hearing on the merits on the 29th. And why is that important? Because this Commission has taken the position that you cannot present a witness on a motion docket. So I want to make sure that we maintain that procedure.

Now we drop down to arguments raised by

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AT&T. I agree with the first comment made by AT&T Counsel that the ALJ's decision was not inconsistent. for AT&T said that their witnesses were denied the opportunity to testify. I would agree with him, but only if those irrelevant witnesses were denied. I don't believe if they had something relevant they would have been denied. I don't believe this Commission has ever denied a issue - - I mean, has never denied a witness that had relevant information. I think the ALJ determined that the witnesses and the things that they were wanting to talk about were not relevant at that time in the proceeding.

Now when the time comes for a full hearing on the merits, those witnesses are welcome back and I believe the ALJ would have no problem with hearing their testimony.

VICE CHAIRMAN ANTHONY: Well, wait a minute. If AT&T felt that the document had some legal deficiencies and before the ALJ was an opportunity to give interim approval to it, don't you think that is relevant?

MR. GRAY: No, Your Honor. The crux of what we were looking at that day was talking interim relief, whether or not it should be allowed to go into effect, not the approval, because when you start talking about the deficiency you're getting to the approval side of it. That was not the issue that was before the ALJ at that time.

And then, like I say, the other witness, the

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one to talk about the status of the AT&T negotiations, it
was not relevant at that proceeding.

And, Your Honor, I would just draw your attention to page 93 of the transcript which your office has been provided. And that might provide guidance. Now I didn't read the full text, so I would encourage you to read it and, you know, form your own opinion from there.

it go into effect on an interim basis is to allow

Southwestern Bell to go to the FCC. Your Honors, as we have said, we got a 252 and 271. He refuses to acknowledge the fact that 252 even exists. The ALJ based his decision on 252. So I disagree with his statement. There are other reasons. 252, namely.

Counsel also made statements regarding the appendixes. I would encourage you to look at page 31 of the transcript wherein it was my argument - - we talked about - - Southwestern Bell had come to the Commission Staff ahead of time and had gone through the appendixes with Staff.

AT&T took it upon themselves this week to come in and talk to Staff about the appendixes also. So we have had an opportunity to go through the appendixes.

Sprint makes the argument that they're here to make sure the requirements are met. Your Honors, I have been doing this for eight years and never has an IXC come to

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the Commission and said we're here to help you out. Never has an IXC come to this Commission and said Southwestern Bell was not following state or federal law. I find it pretty ironic that they choose to come in at this point.

Motion to Dismiss. The ALJ found that under 252 there was basis for the application to keep going. Now from listening to the ALJ, it is my belief that if it had only been a 271 filing, the ALJ probably would have concurred with MCI at that point and dismissed the case. However, 271 was not the point that the ALJ made his decision on.

And you can tell that the crux of Mr.

Stakem's argument dealt with 271. I believe to him 252

probably is a naughty word at this point, but he never

mentioned the 252 throughout his pleading or through his

arguments. His statement was you are entitled to the full

60 days and you should take it. Well, Your Honor, if we

don't believe that we need 60 days, we shouldn't have to

take it. And I don't believe that is Mr. Stakem's or any

other company's position to tell us what time frame that we

should conduct our work under.

And he made reference to there being some deficiency in the filing. Once we have had an opportunity to fully look at it and once we get to the merit hearing, we will address any deficiency.